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Security markets between generations are naturally incomplete in a laissez-faire economy since 
risk sharing agreements cannot be made with the unborn. But suppose that generations could 
trade if, for example, a representative of the unborn negotiated on their behalf today. What would 
the trades look like? Can government fiscal policy be used to replicate these trades? Would 
completing this missing market be Pareto improving when the introduction of the new security 
changes the prices of existing assets? This paper characterizes analytically the hypothetical 
trades between generations and shows how the government can replicate these trades by taxing 
the realized equity premium on investments in a symmetric fashion. This tax is equivalent to the 
government providing a “collar-like” guarantee on personal investments. When technology 
shocks are mostly driven by changes in depreciation, a positive tax (a long collar) replicates the 
hypothetical trades; this tax is also Pareto improving under fairly general conditions. When 
technology shocks are mostly driven by changes in productivity, the choice between a positive 
and negative tax rate is unclear. However, with log utility, Cobb-Douglas production, and a 
depreciation rate less than 100 percent, a negative tax (short collar) is Pareto improving. 
Simulation analysis is used to consider more complicated cases, including when depreciation and 
productivity are both uncertain. Under the baseline calibration for the U.S., a positive tax (a long 
collar) on the equity premium is Pareto improving. 
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A MATTER OF TRUST: UNDERSTANDING WORLDWIDE PUBLIC PENSION 
CONVERSIONS1 
 
Kent Smetters, University of Pennsylvania, and NBER 
Walter Theseira, University of Pennsylvania2 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Reform of social security systems from traditional pay-as-you-go defined benefit systems 
toward defined-contribution accounts represents one of the most important fiscal policy 
changes worldwide during the past century. Current explanations of this phenomenon lack 
theoretical justification or empirical support. Why have so many countries reformed when 
traditional systems are likely superior in design? Why have these reforms typically have been 
larger in developing countries facing less severe demographic problems? We show that an 
overlapping-generations median voter model can help answer both questions. Larger reforms 
are motivated by a fundamental breakdown of intergenerational trust. Smaller reforms are 
motivated by a lack of trust in the ability of the government to save resources for smoothing 
demographic shocks. Empirical analysis seems to support the basic tenets of the model. 
 
Keywords: Social Security, Trust 
JEL Codes: H0, H55, D7 
 
1. Introduction 
 
One of the most far-reaching shifts in fiscal policy worldwide during the past two 
decades has been the fundamental restructuring of public pension systems. At least 28 
countries spanning five continents have converted, partially or completely, from pay-as-you-
go defined-benefit public pension systems to systems based on funded, defined-contribution 
accounts. Reforms appear to be imminent in several more countries, while other countries 
like the United States have seriously debated converting their public pension systems as well. 
These conversions are potentially the most significant policy reform during the past 
century, except perhaps for the adoption of a market economy itself. Such a claim might at 
                                                 
1 Version: May, 2009. This research was supported by the U.S. Social Security Administration through grant 
#10-P-98363-1-05 to the National Bureau of Economic Research as part of the SSA Retirement Research 
Consortium. The findings and conclusions expressed are solely those of the author(s) and do not represent the 
views of SSA, any agency of the Federal Government, or the NBER. 
2 Smetters: smetters@wharton.upenn.edu. 3620 Locust Walk, SH-DH 3303 Philadelphia, PA 19104. 215-898-
9811. Theseira: waltert@wharton.upenn.edu. 3620 Locust Walk, SH-DH 3303 Philadelphia, PA 19104. Parts of 
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first seem to be a stretch. There have been many large public policy changes during the past 
century: Trade barriers have been curtailed; price controls have been dropped across many 
sectors; major industries have been deregulated; high tax rates levied on narrow bases have 
been replaced with lower, broad-based taxes; smarter monetary policy has brought inflation 
into check in many developed countries; and, many state-sponsored enterprises in developing 
countries have been removed. But their gains likely pale in comparison to pension reform.  
Previous simulation analyses suggests that moving the United States Social Security 
system from pay-as-you-go financing to full funding could produce as much as a 30 percent 
or more increase in the size of capital stock as well as increase potential (full) lifetime 
income by over 20 percent3 These potential gains are much larger than those associated with 
fundamentally reforming the US federal income tax (Altig et al 2000), and potentially larger 
than most other types of fiscal reforms, including even the adoption of free trade.4 
While pension fund conversions from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution 
(DC) plans in the private sector have been largely motivated by labor market mobility within 
a country, this explanation does not hold for public pension systems.  In fact, the public plan 
conversions seem fairly puzzling.  A traditional public DB plan can be funded like a standard 
DC plan. Moreover, in the presence of economic uncertainty, traditional plans more easily 
allow for inter-generational risk sharing. Financial illiteracy, moral hazard and adverse 
selection seem only to buttress the case for the traditional pension system. 
So why have so many countries moved, or are in the process of moving, away from 
unfunded DB plans towards at least partially funded DC plans?  Adding to the puzzle is that 
                                                                                                                                                       
this paper were written with Cindy Park while at the U.S. Treasury in the years 2000-1. We thank Robert 
Palacios and participants at the NBER Summer meetings and the ASSA meetings for helpful comments. 
3 Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) reviews the literature. 
4 See Baldwin (1992) for estimates of the dynamic gains from trade liberalization. 
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these reforms have taken on numerous shapes and sizes across the world, and typically have 
been larger in developing countries, which don’t face the same severe demographic problems 
motivating the reform debate in developed countries.  
 Table 1 gives an overview of reforming countries: the date of reform, the degree of 
privatization and whether participation in the reformed system was voluntary or required. To 
estimate the degree of privatization, we developed an actuarial model for each country that 
incorporates that country’s specific reform rules, income distribution, life expectancy and 
other key economic and demographic variables (Appendix B). The degree of privatization is 
then calculated by estimating the annuitized fraction of retirement benefits provided by the 
new defined contribution system relative to the remaining (if any) defined benefit system for 
the median worker. Figure 1 plots the reform size against the per-capita income for each 
country. Notice that larger reforms typically occur in countries with lower per-capita income. 
 
Table 1 
 
 
 
Country 
 
Year Personal 
Accounts 
Introduced 
Percent of Retirement 
Benefit from Personal 
Account after Reform for 
Average Worker 
 
 
Voluntary Participation Choice / Notes 
Chile 1981 96.25% New workers must join new system; current 
workers may choose between systems.
Switzerland 1982 62.87% No.
U.K. 1986 n.a Yes. Due to voluntary participation, 
problems with private pension 
administration, and rollbacks of the scheme, 
the U.K. is treated as a non-reforming 
country in our study.
Peru 1991 62.33% Yes.
Australia 1992 71.69% No.
Argentina 1993 62.98% Yes.
Colombia 1993 32.51% Yes, workers are allowed to switch back and 
forth every three years. 
China 1995 n.a. No. No unified national social security 
system. Implementation of reforms varies 
widely with substantial discretion by local 
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government. Therefore, China is treated as a 
non-reforming country in our study. 
Mexico 1995 98.87% No.
Uruguay 1995 22.96% Employees over 40 years old can choose, 
those under 40 years old and new workers 
must join new system. 
El Salvador 1996 90.97% All new and young workers must join new 
system.  Older workers must remain with old 
system.  Workers between 36 and 55 (men) / 
50 (women) years old may choose. 
Bolivia 1997 100.00% No.
Hungary 1997 37.96% No.
Denmark 1998 79.54% No.
Kazakhstan 1998 100.00% No.
Poland 1998 44.96% Yes.
Sweden 1998 17.73% Workers born before 1938 stay with old 
system; those born after 1953 switch to new 
system; gradual transition from old to new 
system for workers born between 1938 and 
1953.
Croatia 1999 31.48% Workers between age of 40 and 50 at the 
time of reform can opt into the new system. 
Older workers remain in old system, younger 
workers must participate in new system.
Costa Rica 2000 7.92% No.
Bulgaria 2000 24.39%  All workers born after 1959 must participate 
in the new system.
Hong Kong 2000 n.a. No. Country is not sovereign self-governing 
state. Therefore, country is not modeled and 
not included in our dataset. 
Nicaragua 2000 100.00% System implementation suspended in 2005 
and prior public pension system restored.
Dominican 
Republic 
2001 83.81% No.
Ecuador 2001 22.96% System implementation pending legal 
decision on constitutional grounds. 
Latvia 2001 57.53% All workers born after July 1st 1971 must 
participate in new system. Participation is 
voluntary for older workers. 
Russian 
Federation 
2001 26.71% All workers born after 1966 must participate 
in new system.
Estonia 2002 55.65% All workers born after 1982 must participate 
in the new system.
Lithuania 2003 25.99% Yes.
Slovakia 2003 39.68% Full implementation in 2005. All workers 
entering the labor force in 2005 or later must 
participate in the new system. Existing 
workers could opt into the new system 
before June 30th 2006. 
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Source: Authors’ model based on rules of each country’s pension system as published in Social Security 
Programs Throughout the World. See Appendix B. Some countries have instituted reforms, but were not 
modeled or included in the empirical investigation because of lack of other data. Hong Kong is excluded 
because it is not an independent self-governing country. For Denmark, our data refers to the 1998 reform 
creating “SP ‘Special Pension Savings’” Personal Accounts. Our model calculation of the benefits from 
personal accounts in Denmark includes both the “SP” scheme and the preexisting “ATP ‘Ordinary 
Supplementary Pension’” employment-related mandatory defined contribution scheme dating back to 1964. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Size of Reforms Relative to Per-Capita Income at the Time of Reform 
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This paper addresses both of these questions using an overlapping-generations 
median voter model. One central theme emerges: the public pension conversions reflect a 
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fundamental mistrust in the ability of the government to provide secure retirement resources.  
The exact nature of the distrust, though, typically differs between reforming countries.   
In countries where reforms have been the largest (typically developing countries), the 
distrust in the government provision of public pensions is conditioned on potential instability.  
In particular, workers do not trust the government to run even a strict pay-as-you-go system 
anymore.  Personal funded DC accounts give workers greater transparency and control.  
While personal accounts can be subject to their own political risks, government interference 
is more obvious.  The concomitant increase in the level of funding is not the primary object 
of reform itself.  Rather the increase in funding is a byproduct of securing a safer retirement 
without trusting a pay-as-you-go scheme that only the government can run.5  In other words, 
personal accounts would have been created even without reference to demographic concerns. 
In contrast, in countries where reforms have been smaller (typically in developed 
economies), the role of instability is less important.  Instead, the primary objective is to pre-
fund future benefits since many of these countries face severe demographic problems.  
However, the government is not fully trusted to properly save the resources that are needed to 
pre-fund some of these future benefits.  So the creation of personal accounts is a byproduct of 
attempting to increase funding.  If these countries faced no demographic pressures, the 
incentive to create personal accounts would be greatly reduced. 
Section 2 critically analyzes previous economics attempts to explain conversions to 
personal accounts.  Common rationales include: higher returns; improvements in domestic 
financial institutional development; improving labor supply and retirement incentives; and 
                                                 
5 A couple of countries have adopted unfunded ‘notional’ defined-contribution accounts, sometimes in addition 
to funded defined-contribution accounts. While a notional account does create a clearer contract with the 
government, the lack of funding still requires a lot of trust that future governments will fulfill previous 
promises.  
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hedging demographic changes.  In each case, a politically-stable and transparent government 
could have achieved similar – likely superior – results within the traditional system.  The 
traditional also has lower transaction and other costs (Diamond 1996). 
 Section 3 presents a simple model of a pension system as a game between median 
voters of successive generations. The model incorporates the potential for fundamental 
reform as well as the potential for only a partial reform, that is, without fundamental reform. 
 Section 4 then presents empirical evidence while Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Review of Common Explanations of Reform 
We now critically examine several traditional reasons for pension reform. 
 
2.1. Pursuing Larger Returns 
As traditional public pension systems around the world begin to mature, it is 
becoming increasingly clear to policymakers and voters that traditional systems provide poor 
returns. Privatization, it is sometimes argued, can improve the returns. 
Figure 2 reports the average effective (or “internal”) annualized rates of return earned 
in the United States Social Security system by generation over time. Effective rates of return 
have declined dramatically over time.  The composite average U.S. worker who began to 
collect a benefit at age 65 in 1941 received a 36½ percent effective annual rate of return on 
his pension contributions.  In sharp contrast, a person born today into the mature U.S. Social 
Security system is projected to receive less than a 2 percent effective rate of return.   
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Figure 2 
Effective Real Rates of Returns to the U.S. Public Pension System 
Source: Dean R. Leimer, "Cohort-Specific Measures of Lifetime Net Social Security Transfers," ORS 
Working Paper No. 59, Social Security Administration, 1994. 
 
The declining rate of return stems directly from pay-as-you-go financing itself: 
money flowing into the pension system gets distributed immediately as benefit payments to 
retirees. Early retirees receive a windfall which is paid for in present value by future 
generations. Future generations receive a positive rate of return under a stationary tax rate 
only to the extent that the payroll tax base grows with population and productivity. Since 
windfalls to early generations have already been consumed, there is no potential for 
recovering them. This zero-sum condition of pay-as-you-go financing can be traced back to 
Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965); it has been extensively explored since then.6  
                                                 
6 See, for example, Breyer (1989), Geanakopolis, Mitchell, and Zeldes (1999) and Mariger (1999). 
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2.2. Improvements in Financial Markets 
Another commonly cited reason for pension reform is to deepen the domestic capital 
markets. Figure 3 shows the amount of private credit as a share of GDP in several countries 
before and after pension reform (a hash mark indicates the respective reform dates for 
reforming countries).  Private credit includes the total financial resources provided to the 
private sector through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, trade credits and other 
accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment.  Private credit is one of the most 
commonly used metrics in the literature for indicating an economy’s level of financial 
sophistication, especially for less developed countries in which equity financing is less 
common. But changes in private credit also reflect the changes in the private savings level 
following pension reform rather than just changes in financial market institutions.  Hence, the 
private credit levels for several reforming West European countries, where financial markets 
were already sophisticated before reform, are also shown in order to isolate the saving effect. 
Private credit levels in Latin American and Eastern European countries are well 
below those in Western European countries.  Even these differences underestimate the larger 
degree of capital market development in Western European countries, whose investments 
tend to be relatively more equity financed. Also notice that private credit indeed expanded in 
each country following reform, except for Mexico and Argentina, both of which suffered 
currency and other financial crises.  This evidence would seem to buttress the case for the 
hypothesis that the development of domestic capital market institutions was a major 
influence in reform. After reform, many of these Latin American and Eastern European 
countries also put in place restrictions to prevent workers from investing their money abroad, 
which also seems consistent with the desire to develop the domestic capital market. 
10 
 
Figure 3 
Private Credit as a Percent of GDP 
 
(Reform dates shown as short vertical lines) 
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Figure 3 (Continued) 
Private Credit as a Percent of GDP 
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Figure 3 (Continued) 
Private Credit as a Percent of GDP 
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Figure 3 (Continued) 
Private Credit as a Percent of GDP 
 
 
Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
Pe
rc
en
t Switzerland
Sweden
U.K.
Australia
14 
 
But notice that the post-reform rise in private credit tended to be sharper in Western 
European countries despite the smaller size of their pension reforms relative to the Latin 
American and Eastern European nations.  Since most Western European countries already 
had sophisticated financial markets prior to reform, much of their increase presumably 
stemmed purely from increases in the amount of capital, since pension reforms presumably 
had little impact on the relative reliance on equity financing.  This result suggests that a large 
fraction of the increase in private credit in Latin American and Eastern European nations 
might also be driven by the saving effect rather than by financial institution development. 
Moreover, except Mexico and Argentina, the availability of private credit began to 
increase in most Latin American and Eastern European countries before the introduction of 
personal accounts.  (Since the personal accounts are unlikely to have a large effect for several 
years, the effective pre-reform trend is even longer.)  Indeed, the introduction of personal 
accounts does not seem to increase the pre-reform trend in most countries, suggesting that 
other factors might also be playing an important role in the expansion of private credit. 
Pension reforms in developing countries were typically part of larger reforms that 
spurred capital market development.  As discussed by Walker and Lefort (2002), the largest 
reforms in developing countries include: macroeconomic stability; tax incentives; capital 
control liberalization; deregulation and competition in the financial services; property rights, 
bankruptcy legislation and investor protection; and, privatization of state-owned enterprises.   
When controlling for country-specific factors, Walker and Lefort find little evidence that 
pension reform improved financial market development, including the cost of capital, stock 
market volatility and other measures.  Only when other factors are ignored does pension 
reform have some effect in developing the domestic capital market.  Consistently, our own 
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empirical estimation (reported in Section 4) provides only weak evidence that public pension 
reform was motivated by shallow financial markets. 
Moreover, personal accounts were not the only way to develop financial institutions.  
Pre-funding existing traditional public pension systems could, in theory, have also done the 
job.  Like in Chile’s original private account system (since liberalized), public pension 
investments could have been restricted to domestic markets and divided among private fund 
managers. If domestic capital market development were truly the motivating concern, local 
investments through the public pension system would have presumably better avoided the 
appearance of a direct “tax” on returns earned by workers by forcing them to invest 
domestically. (Some developed countries including Singapore have invested their public 
pension funds directly in public projects.) Within the traditional system, a home bias in 
pension investments has no direct effect on a worker’s pension benefit since benefits remain 
defined by law. Instead, any return reduction is a hidden obligation on future generations.  
 
2.3. Enhancements to Labor Supply 
Payroll taxes in a traditional defined benefit system are distorting for several reasons. 
First, workers are forced to invest into a pay-as-you-go public pension “asset” that pays a rate 
of return below what they could have earned in the private sector.  Second, redistribution 
produces larger rates of returns for lower-income workers along with smaller returns for 
higher-income workers.  Third, borrowing constrained workers might not wish to make any 
contributions at younger ages, even at a market rate of return.  Fourth, particular features of 
the program, such as a spousal benefit, cause additional distortions. Fifth, as documented by 
Gruber and Wise (1998, eds. 1999), specific rules encourage early retirement. 
16 
 
Private accounts are argued to ameliorate these tax-like disincentives to labor supply. 
Each of these distortions, however, can be just as easily addressed with the traditional 
pension system as with pension reform. Inferior rates of return are a natural outcome of pay-
as-you-go financing or redistribution; similarly, tax-induced distortions caused by 
redistribution are simply the cost of redistribution, which would also exist in a private 
pension system that maintained the same level of redistribution.7 Borrowing constraints could 
be lessened by starting payroll tax rates at a low level early in life and increasing them with 
age in order to collect the same present value of income from each worker on average 
(Hubbard and Judd, 1987). The other distortions are consequences of the rules specific to 
different public pension systems and can be addressed within the existing pension system. 
 
2.4. Addressing Demographic Changes 
It is also commonly claimed that traditional public pension systems are unable to deal 
effectively with demographic problems since payroll taxes must increase sharply or benefits 
decrease sharply as the ratio of retirees to workers increases. In contrast, private accounts 
should be less vulnerable to demographic changes since retirement benefits are directly tied 
to previous savings. However, as shown in Table 2 higher-income countries face the largest 
predicted declines in worker-retiree ratios; higher income countries are also those with the 
smallest pension reforms. In fact, as Figure 4 shows, among actual reforming countries, there 
appears to be an inverse correlation between demographic problems and the size of actual 
reform. It is not clear, therefore, that demographics is the main impetus behind large reforms. 
                                                 
7 In fact, actual implementations of privatization actually reduce labor supply distortions. Smetters (2006) 
derives the neutrality of labor supply to pension reform under the “carve out” scenario; he also demonstrates 
that “shutdown” reforms actually reduce labor supply incentives. 
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Table 2 
Past and Projected Worker-Retiree Ratios 
 
 
 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 
     
High-Income Countries at time of their Reform 
Australia 3.6 3.5 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.6 
Denmark 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.5 
Hong Kong 4.2 4.3 4.2 3.5 2.8 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1 
Sweden 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 
Switzerland 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 
United 
Kingdom 
2.6 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 
          
          
Medium-Income Countries at time of their Reform 
Croatia 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 
Hungary 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.6 
Poland 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.2 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 
Uruguay 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.1 
         
Poorer Countries at time of their Reform 
Argentina 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.4 
Bolivia 7.2 7.2 7.4 7.4 7.2 7.0 6.6 6.1 5.4 4.8 
Chile 5.5 5.2 4.8 4.4 3.9 3.3 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.2 
China 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.0 4.1 3.7 3.0 2.4 2.1 2.0 
Colombia 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.0 5.5 4.9 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.9 
Costa Rica 6.9 6.6 6.3 5.8 5.1 4.2 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.5 
Domenica Rep. 7.9 7.5 7.3 6.9 6.1 5.2 4.3 3.6 3.2 2.8 
Kazakhstan 5.3 4.3 4.9 4.9 4.4 3.6 3.2 3.1 3.1 2.9 
El Salvador 6.7 7.3 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.3 6.7 5.5 4.3 3.4 
Mexico 7.7 7.6 7.2 6.7 5.9 5.1 4.4 3.9 3.2 2.8 
Nicaragua 8.9 9.4 9.9 9.7 8.7 7.8 6.8 5.8 4.9 4.1 
Peru 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.7 6.1 5.5 4.8 4.1 3.5 3.0 
Source: Data provided by Robert Palacios, World Bank. 
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Figure 4 
Size of Reforms Relative to Projected Population aged 65 and older in 2025 
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Moreover, in theory, a traditional system could effectively deal with changes in 
fertility rates by accumulating large reserves when the worker-retiree ratio is large and then 
spending down the reserves as the ratio decreases.  (Since 1983, the United States has been 
building up its Social Security “trust fund” in an attempt to buffer future costs associated 
with the retirement of baby boomers.) If these reserves were saved, taxes would remain 
roughly flat throughout the entire period, as collections would initially exceed costs and then 
fall below. A personal account system would do no better in hedging demographic risk. 
However, creating an additional reserve within a traditional pension system requires a level 
of trust that the money will be saved, a consideration to which we now turn. 
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3. A Model of Trust 
We now show how a full breakdown of the inter-generational trust produces large, 
fundamental pension reform; demographics play very little role. However, smaller reforms 
are also motivated by a lack of trust of a different sort: while the government is trusted to run 
a strict pay-as-you-go system, it might not be trusted to truly save the additional reserve 
required to hedge a demographic shock. Smaller reforms are mainly demographic driven. 
Consider a simple overlapping-generations median voter model. There are tN  first-
period agents alive at time t.  Population at time t grows at rate 
1
t
t
t
Nn N −
≡ .  The total wage 
base at time t grows at a gross rate tG ≡ ( )1 tg+ ≡  ( )( )1 1tn x+ +  , where x  is the exogenous 
and constant rate of technological change between time periods.  We initially assume that the 
population is stationary and so we often drop the time subscripts for N and G.  The gross rate 
of return to risk-less capital is ( )1R r= + , where r is the net rate of return.  The wage rate at 
time t is tw , which grows at rate x, i.e., ( )1 1t tw x w+ = + .  Factor prices are (trend) stationary, 
as in a small open economy or with linear technology. 
An agent born at time t lives for three periods.  The agent has exogenous levels of 
productivity of 1α  and 2α  in the first and second periods, respectively.  Productivity in the 
third period is zero, where he retires. Lifetime utility is given by ( )
3
, ,
1
,1k k t k t
k
u c l
=
β −∑ , where: 
β  is the growth-adjusted discount rate; ,k tc  is the level of consumption at age k at time t; and, 
,k tl  is the respective level of labor supply, where the total time endowment each period is 
normalized to unity.  The function u(,) is increasing and concave in both arguments. Lifetime 
utility is maximized subject to the following budget constraints: 
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(1) ( )1, 1, 1 1, 1t t t tc a w l+ = α − τ   
(2)  ( )2, 1 2, 1 2 1 2, 1 1,1t t t t tc a w l Ra+ + + ++ = α − τ +  
(3)  3, 2 2, 1 2t t tc Ra b+ + += +  
Where a represents private assets, b is the social security benefit received in the third period 
that is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis with a proportional tax τ  on labor earnings. 
For expositional simplicity the analysis herein focuses on a social security system 
where benefits are proportional to previous contributions.  In a proportional and stationary 
system, every agent earns the same gross “internal” rate of return G on their social security 
contributions, which is equal to the growth rate of the wage tax base.  The pay-as-you-go 
social security benefit received by generation t during their third year, therefore, equals8 
(4) 22 1 1, 2 1 2, 1t t t t tb G w l G w l+ + += τα + τα  
  
3.1. A Theory of Fundamental Reforms: Voting Over Pay-as-you-go Financing 
Suppose that the population growth rate, n, is not very large, in particular, that 
( ) ( ) ( )21 1 1 2n n n+ < + + = + . Then, the age-2 agent is the median voter that determines 
whether the pay-as-you-go system continues. Since the median voter is not retired himself, 
he will vote to continue the system if and only if two conditions are satisfied:  
 
(A) (Incentive Compatible) 
2
1 1, 2 1 2, 12
2 1 2, 1
t t t tt
t t
G w l G w lbw l
R R
+ ++
+ +
τα + τα
τα < =    
(B) (Continuation) The current age-1 agent, generation t, votes for τ . 
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Condition (A) says that the present value of maintaining the pay-as-you-go social 
security program to the median voter must exceed the value of the second-period taxes saved 
from abandoning the system. Even though pay-as-you-go social security is actuarially unfair 
to age-1 households in a dynamically efficient economy where R > G, age-2 households have 
already contributed to the system in the previous year. Hence, its incentive compatibility 
constraint can hold even if social security pays a lower internal rate of return. 
Condition (B) is the usual recursive “trigger strategy” belief that enforces cooperation 
across generations in pay-as-you-go games (Verbon 1988a,b; Kotlikoff, Persson and 
Svensson 1988; Drazen 2001; Cooley and Soares 1999; Rangel 2003). The current age-2 
median voter won’t vote to support continuation of the pay-as-you-go system unless the next 
median voter (currently age 1), when the current age-2 agent is then retired, also supports 
continuation, ad infinitum. Cooperation in enforced with a simple trigger: Any age-2 agent 
that abandons the system will be sufficiently punished by reducing his third-period social 
security benefit by more, in present value, than his second-period tax savings, 2 1 2, 1t tw l+ +α τ . 
Condition (A) is likely to hold in stable economies with a reasonable value of R. To 
see this, suppose that 1α  = 2α  (i.e., flat productivity profiles) and 1/R = β  (i.e., interest rate 
equals the growth-adjusted rate of time preference). Then condition (A) can be simplified to: 
(A’) 
2 2
1 G G G G
R R R
+
< + =  
The first term G R  in equation (A’) corresponds to the tax payments paid in the second 
period of life and represents the relative rate of return produced by pay-as-you-go financing 
G relative to the rate R which could have been received in the capital market. In a 
                                                                                                                                                       
8 I.e., in a stationary economy, equation (4) can be rewritten as the standard pay-as-you-go constraint, 
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dynamically inefficient economy, 1G R < , reflecting the opportunity cost of capital. In other 
words, the median voter would have been better off if he could have invested his payroll 
taxes into the capital market. The second term 2G R  reflects the fact that the age-2 median 
voter, however, has already paid into the pay-as-you-go system in the first period, a 
contribution that would be lost if he votes to abandon the system. The inequality shown in 
equation (A’), therefore, holds, except for fairly large values of R >> G. In that case, the 
opportunity cost of the median voter’s second-year contribution is large enough that he is 
willing to forfeit his first-year contribution in order to obtain a larger rate of return. 
 However, the pay-as-you-go system unravels if the discount rate R effectively 
becomes too high, potentially in response to uncertainty about the future. Since the “trigger” 
is recursive, the game collapses if it is not incentive compatible for any future median voter. 9 
 
Proposition 1. A pay-as-you tax τ  is a Nash, subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if 
Conditions (A) and (B) hold for current and future median voters. Also, let max[0, ]R
+∈ℜ  be 
the support over the values of R such that Condition (A) holds. maxR  is bounded above. □ 
 
 So we arrive at a theory for large social security reforms: the system unravels if a 
current or future median voter faces a large enough value of R, which effectively causes them 
to highly discount the value of future social security benefits. Proposition 1 shows that such a 
value of R exists for any size of the pay-as-you-go system, τ . 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
2 2 1 2 1, 2 1 2 2 2, 2t t t t t t t tN b N w l N w l+ + + + + + += τα + τα . 
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Remark 1. Condition (A) can be generalized to the case of non-stationary demographics as:  
(A’’)  1 2 1 1, 2 2 1 2, 12 1 2, 1
t t t t t t t
t t
G G w l G w l
w l
R
+ + + + +
+ +
τα + τα
α τ <  
Even with substantial deviations from stationary demographics (e.g., a “baby boomer 
bulge.”), the median voter is age-2 and Condition (A’’) holds. To see the latter result, again 
suppose that 1α  = 2α  and 1/R = β . Condition (A’’) is simplified to 2 1 21 t t t
G G G
R R
+ + +< + . With 
(trend) stationary factor prices, a demographic bulge, as witnessed in many developed 
countries, implies 1 2 0t tG G+ +> > .
10 For some parameter values, the new maximum support 
value of R, ''maxR , might actually be larger than the support, maxR , with stationary 
demographics; for some parameter values, it is smaller. In either case, the prevalence of non-
stationary demographics does not play an important role in undermining the trigger. □ 
 
3.2. An Extension to Partial Reforms: Including a Social Security Reserve 
 The knife-edge nature of the trigger strategy used in Proposition 1, however, rules out 
an explanation of partial reforms. Moreover, as explained in Remark 1, demographics alone 
do not play a large role in explaining a collapse of intergenerational cooperation. So why 
then do some countries reform but not completely abandon their social security systems?  
 Consider now a dual policy space in which votes are also cast over an additional 
proportional payroll tax, aτ , which might be interpreted as being used to fund a social 
security “reserve.” A direct majority (median voter) model also determines the level of this 
                                                                                                                                                       
9 It can be shown that social security will continue provided that the probability of future collapse is not too 
large. This type of result is fairly standard in dynamic reputation games. 
10 While n < 0 is possible, G > 0 since n > -1 for any population to remain. 
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payroll tax.11 If cohort t’s own future social security benefit is then increased by 
2
1 1, 2 1 2, 1
a a
t t t tR w l R w l+ +τ α + τ α  then 
aτ  represents a pure “funded” portion of social security.12 
Assuming that borrowing constraints are not binding, such a payroll tax, however, has no 
impact on any household’s budget constraint; it just substitutes public saving for private. A 
“partial privatization” that simply undoes this payroll tax, aτ , is economically neutral. 
 Suppose instead that the government contemporaneously redistributes aτ  instead of 
saving it for each generation. Of course, a majority of voters might choose such redistribution 
by its sheer voting power. However, our motivation in this setting is more practical: few 
people understand government budgetary arithmetic. (The U.S. debate over creating a true 
“lock box” for Social Security reflects that concern.) This additional revenue, therefore, 
might be viewed as a part of general pool of revenue that is up for grabs. 
 To avoid Condorcet type of cycles, we need to consider voting over a specific 
redistribution function.13 For simplicity, consider voting over a policy rule that distributes 
these resources as a subsidy across the population on a constant per-capita (per vote) basis. 
Alternative policy rules could be considered as well; the current rule simplifies the analysis. 
Assume that labor supply is inelastically supplied at one unit.14 Let ts  denote the per-
capita subsidy at time t, in the form of a rebate to each worker: 
 (5) 1 2 1
2 1
a a
t t t t
t
t t t
N w N ws
N N N
−
− −
τ α + τ α
=
+ +
. 
                                                 
11 Alternatively, both issues could be voted upon as a bundle, as in a representative democracy model. The 
solution that we derive extends to this case as well, with some fairly minor modifications. 
12 More technically, we require that, when aτ  is implement, benefits are not increase on the current age-3 
retirees. Current age-2 households then see their third-period benefit increase to 2 1 2, 1
a
t tR w l+ +τ α . 
13 This same issue arises with most fiscal policies: for example, we previously considered voting over a fixed 
form of redistribution from workers to retirees. Voting over exogenous fiscal policy functions is commonly 
assumed in the literature to avoid Condorcet types of voting indeterminacies. 
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The numerator in equation (5) equals the additional tax revenue collected from workers at 
time t. The denominator is equal to the size of the population, including retirees at time t 
( 2tN − ), age-2 workers ( 1tN − ), and age-1 workers ( tN ). Workers who are age 1 at time t will 
vote for this subsidy in a one-shot static game (we extend to a dynamic game below) if  
(C1) 1
a
t ts w> τ α . 
In words, the value of the subsidy must exceed the taxes paid by the additional tax. Similarly, 
workers who are age 2 at time t will vote for it if: 
(C2) 2
a
t ts w> τ α . 
Since factor prices are fixed, retirees will always vote for the subsidy, i.e.,  
(C3)  0ts > . 
With some algebraic substitution, Conditions (C1) and (C2) can be reduced to: 
(C1’) ( ) 12 21 1 2 1
1 1
1 1t t t tN N N n
−
− − − −
α α
> + ⇒ > + +
α α
 
(C2’) ( ) ( )1 11 12 1
2 2
1 1 1t t t t tN N N n n
− −
− −
α α
> + ⇒ > + + +
α α
 
In words, (C1’), for example, says that age-1 workers at time t are more willing to 
support the social security reserve if age-2 workers, whom are also in the tax base, are 
sufficiently more productive than age-1 workers, adjusted by the other population competing 
for the transfer. Intuitively, given the simple per-capita rebate subsidy rule, age-1 households 
want to effectively “pool” their reserves with more productive age-2 workers, provided that 
there are not too many other competing voters, 1 2t tN N− −+ , participating in the subsidy.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
14 The tax-subsidy distorts labor supply, which we want to abstract from for the sake of simplicity. 
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Lemma 1. (i) With non-negative population growth ( 0tn ≥ ), age-1 and age-2 workers at 
time t won’t both support a social security reserve, aτ . (ii) The converse is not true: there is a 
non-empty set of parameters, { }1 2 1 1, , , ,t t tN N N− +α α , where both workers reject a reserve. □ 
To prove Lemma 1, insert (C1’) into (C2’): ( ) ( ) ( )
11 1 1
1 11 1 1 1 1t t tn n n
−− − −
− −
⎡ ⎤+ + > + + +⎣ ⎦ , 
which is a contradiction in the presence of a non-negative population growth. However, it is 
easy to show that the converse is not true: workers of both ages can vote to reject a reserve.15 
Intuitively, the transfer to age-3 retirees breaks the direct linkage between these two cases 
since the redistribution between workers is not zero-sum.  
 With non-negative trend stationary demographics (where 0tn n= ≥ ), a social security 
reserve will either always exist or not; a reversal of policy cannot occur.16 Consider first the 
case where age-1 workers favor the reserve. By Lemma 1 (i), age-2 workers will oppose:  
(6) ( ) 12
1
1 1 n −α > + +
α
 
(7) ( ) 21
2
1 1 n −α < + +
α
 
Aged-3 retirees, of course, still favor the social security reserve redistribution. Combining 
their votes with age-1 households will produce a winning coalition in favor of the reserve 
since ( ) ( )1 1 1 2n n< − + + = . Now, consider the case where age-1 households oppose the 
social security reserve and age-2 workers favor it (i.e., the opposite signs in equations (6) and 
(7)). If 1 2n <  then the winning coalition always favors the reserve since ( )1 1 1n n+ < + − ; if 
                                                 
15 For example, both aged workers will vote against a reserve for the following parameter combination: 
1 1.25α = , 2 1.75α =  , and 1 2t t tN N N− −= =  
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1 2n >  then age-1 workers are plentiful enough to always vote down the reserve. Finally, by 
Lemma 1 (ii), both aged workers can also reject a social security reserve under the right 
parameter combination (e.g., 1 1.25α = , 2 1.75α = ; 0n = ), i.e., reverse the sign of the 
inequality shown in equation (6). In particular, they always create a winning coalition that 
rejects the reserve since ( )1 1 1n n− < + +  when 0 1 2n ≥ > − . We summarize as follows: 
 
Proposition 2. (i) With non-negative trend stationary demographics ( )0tn n= ≥ , a policy 
reversal of social security reserving (i.e., 0atτ > ; 1 0
a
t+τ = =0) cannot occur. (ii) With non-
stationary demographics, there exists a non-empty parameter set in which social security 
reserving is eventually reversed, i.e., “partial privatization.” □ 
 
 We have already proven Proposition 2 (ii). We use an example to prove Part (ii) 
under the fairly plausible restriction 0tn ≥ , i.e., non-negative population growth.
17   
 
Example 1. Fix 1 1.25α =  and 2 1.75α = . To reduce notation, set 1
a
t twτ = = . Hence, an age-j 
agent will support a social security reserve at time t, aτ , if t js > α . Consider the following 
sequence of cohort sizes: {30, 100, 200, 400, 450, 500}. In other words, sharp increases in 
cohort sizes are followed by much smaller growth rates, near trend stationary: 
                                                                                                                                                       
16 Technically, we only require 12tn n= ≥ − . 
17  Part (ii) holds under an even larger parameter space if population growth is not non-negative. 
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Table 3 
 
  Age 1  Age 2  Age 3  Subsidy  Votes  For  – 
Votes Against Time 1α  1N  2α  2N  3α  3N  ts  
T 1.25  200  1.75  100  0.0  30  1.29  +130 
t + 1 1.25  400  1.75  200  0.0  100  1.21  ‐500 
t + 2 1.25  450  1.75  400  0.0  200  1.20  ‐650 
t + 2 1.25  500  1.75  450  0.0  400  1.04  ‐550 
 
An additional social security reserve is established (by +130 votes) at t in face of a large 
demographic transition, where the worker-to-retiree ratio is 10. As the population ages, the 
worker-to-retiree ratio declines to 5 by time t+1, and the additional social security reserving 
is reversed (by 500 votes). Over the longer-term, the worker-to-retiree ratio settles a little 
above 2; the additional social security reserves are not reintroduced. □ 
 
In other words, a “partial privatization” occurs and is driven by undoing the 
redistribution of the additional payroll tax, aτ . As noted earlier, if the government were able 
to actually save the additional payroll taxes paid by each generation rather than redistribute 
these resources, then the additional payroll tax reserves would be economically neutral. 
It is easy to demonstrate, however, that, even in the presence of a reversal of 
additional social security reserves, there is a value of R such that Conditions (A) and (B) still 
holds, thereby supporting the fundamental pay-as-you-go system. For example, pay-as-you-
go financing continues to hold at R=1 for the parameters used in Example 1.  
In a dynamic setting, where reputation can enforce an equilibrium, it is easy to 
construct examples in the base pay-as-you-go τ  can be supported by a trigger strategy 
(Conditions (A) and (B) hold) while an additional social security reserve aτ  is created and 
then reversed. (In Example 1, set R = 1.9.) In other words, there is a nonempty parameter 
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space where a trigger strategy supports an equilibrium pay-as-you-go transfer τ  from 
workers to retirees but no trigger strategy exists to support an additional tax aτ  from workers 
to both workers and retirees. This result is generally consistent with Rangel (2003) who 
shows that a “Backward Intergenerational Good” can be supported on its own as a trigger 
strategy whereas a “Forward Intergenerational Good” cannot be supported on its own.18 
 
Proposition 3. (i) With trend stationary demographics, Conditions (A) and (B) can hold 
(pay-as-you-go financing) with or without additional social security reserves. (ii) With non-
stationary demographics, a reversal of the additional social security reserving (“partial 
privatization”) can occur even if pay-as-you-go finance remains (no “full privatization”). □ 
 
3.3. Summary 
Fundamental reforms to a public pension system (“full privatizations”) are expected 
to be motivated by economic turbulence that increases the effective discount rate, thereby 
undermining the inter-generational trust (the “trigger strategy”) that is required to enforce 
continuation of the traditional public pension system. Demographic changes play very little 
role in motivating reforms. These types of reforms are consistent in less developed 
economies with a history of more economic and political turbulence. However, smaller 
reforms (“partial privatizations”) are more motivated by demographic concerns and are 
smaller in magnitude since some fundamental inter-generational trust still remains; the 
government is simply not trusted to hold additional reserves against demographic changes. 
                                                 
18 Rangel shows that a FIG can be supported in equilibrium if bundled together as a single vote with a BIG. In 
our voting model herein, however, allowing for bundled voting (as in a representative democracy) would not 
affect our key results provided that the range of voting bundles is not restricted. Under the parameter conditions 
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4. Empirical Findings 
 Our theoretical model, therefore, produces two testable hypotheses. First, large 
reforms are the result of a complete breakdown of the intergenerational game; they are 
primarily motivated by political and economic turbulence and the associated loss of trust 
rather than demographic pressure. Second, smaller reforms are more motivated more by 
demographic pressure rather than a fundamental breakdown of intergenerational trust. This 
section attempts to test these hypotheses empirically. 
 
4.1.  The Data 
We assembled a comprehensive list of 117 countries throughout the world with 
current or historic pay-as-you-go systems.19 We excluded from our collection 20 countries 
with provident fund systems.20 In addition, a few, mostly smaller, countries with pay-as-you-
go systems were excluded due to data constraints.21 The specific countries used in the 
analysis are listed in Appendix A. Of the 117 countries included in our data set, only 26 are 
reformers. Given the limited size of data, our results should be interpreted as only suggestive. 
                                                                                                                                                       
described therein, a representative who favors a bundle of keeping pay-as-you-go financing while abandoning 
reserving would obtain more votes than a representative who tries to maintain both. 
19 Our primary data source was Social Security Programs Throughout the World, published by the U.S. Social 
Security Administration and the International Social Security Administration. This publication includes 
information on almost all countries in the world, but does exclude some countries. Excluded countries consist 
mostly of developing smaller nations, such as Bhutan and Guinea-Bissau, or countries wracked by conflict, like 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Eritrea. Other excluded countries simply do not participate in the international 
community, such as North Korea.  
20 The provident fund countries, many of which are former British colonies such as Singapore, Malaysia, and 
India, operate a mandatory savings scheme similar in spirit to the private account reforms which are the subject 
of this paper. However, unlike private account reforms, these provident fund systems typically offer little 
individual control over investments. All the provident fund systems excluded from our analysis are systems that 
are the original (often since state declaration of independence) pension systems of the countries concerned. 
21 These are the Bahamas, Belize, Barbados, Cape Verde, Malta, which are small nations for which sufficient 
reliable data is not available. For Iceland and Luxembourg, we have insufficient political data available from 
our primary sources because of their small size, although they are advanced economies. Hong Kong’s unique 
political position also excludes it from the analysis. In addition, Cuba, Libya, Liberia, and Uzbekistan are 
excluded because reliable economic data is unavailable. 
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Our dependent (left-hand side) variable in our analysis is the degree of reform, as 
shown previously in Table 1. We calculate the annuitized value of private account 
components, as a percentage of the average retiree’s total pension income, based on the 
published parameters of the pension system. The maximum degree of reform is achieved 
when 100% of the average retiree’s state pension income is derived from private account 
sources. Our calculations explicitly model the idiosyncratic features each country’s reform, 
including state financed minimum pension guarantees and old-age welfare programs, both of 
which tend to reduce the degree of pension income from private sources, depending on the 
income distribution in that country. Our actuarial model for each country incorporates that 
country’s income distribution, life expectancy and other key economic and demographic 
variables. Details of these calculations are in Appendix B. Appendix C explains the variables 
used in our empirical estimation as well their sources in detail. 
To measure the degree of intergenerational ‘trust’ that is needed to continue a pay-as-
you-go system, we examine the amount of historic political instability within a given 
country. Countries with significant historic political instability, due to concomitant regime 
changes and systemic upheaval, should possess less inter-generational trust, and are more 
likely to reform. We constructed an instability index based on data from the Polity IV 
Project, a widely used panel containing political characteristics of 162 countries from 1800-
2006. Our historic instability index measures the number of times a country had a political 
regime lasting at least 5 years, since the inception of the state pension system (summarized in 
Appendix B). This index captures the frequency of regime change, while ignoring extremely 
short and volatile regimes which would have insufficient time to disrupt existing institutions 
severely. 
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Table 4 
Political and Civil Rights 
 
   % of Benefit
 Year Freedom Index Two Years Before Reform 
(1:Most Free to 7:Least Free) 
From  
 Reformed Political Rights Civil Liberties Total Score Private Account
 
Countries with Stronger Records of Political and Civil Rights Two Years Before Reform 
Australia 1992 1 1 1 71.69 
Denmark 1998 1 1 1 79.54 
Sweden 1998 1 1 1 17.73 
Switzerland 1982 1 1 1 62.87 
United Kingdom 1986 1 1 1 n.a. 
Argentina 1993 1 3 1.5 62.98 
Costa Rica 2000 1 2 1.5 7.92 
Estonia 2002 1 2 1.5 55.65 
Hungary 1997 1 2 1.5 37.96 
Latvia 2001 1 2 1.5 57.53 
Lithuania 2003 1 2 1.5 25.99 
Poland 1998 1 2 1.5 44.96 
Slovakia 2003 1 2 1.5 39.68 
Uruguay 1995 1 2 1.5 22.96 
Bulgaria 2000 2 3 2.5 24.39 
Bolivia 1997 2 3 2.5 100.00 
Dominican Rep. 2001 2 3 2.5 83.81 
Ecuador 2001 2 3 2.5 22.96 
Papua N. Guinea 2000 2 3 2.5 100.00 
Peru 1991 2 3 2.5 62.33 
 
Countries with Weaker Records of Political and Civil Rights Two Years Before Reform 
El Salvador 1996 3 3 3 90.97 
Nicaragua 2000 3 3 3 100.00 
Colombia 1993 3 4 3.5 32.51 
Mexico 1995 4 3 3.5 98.87 
Croatia 1999 4 4 4 31.48 
Russia 2001 4 4 4 26.71 
Chile 1981 6 5 5.5 96.25 
Kazakhstan 1998 6 5 5.5 100.00 
China 1995 7 7 7 n.a. 
 Source: Freedom in the World, Freedom House 
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However, it is also likely that countries with a longer history of political freedoms are 
more likely to have the political conditions necessary for the public to express their 
preferences for reform in the face of instability. Toward that end, we include a measure of 
“historic democracy” based on the Total Score from the Freedom House index that is popular 
in the political science literature. Table 4 shows the corresponding values for reforming 
countries in the year of their reform, although our empirical analysis, of course, includes the 
values for non-reforming countries as well. To reduce the potential sensitivity of this variable 
to a single year of data, we take the average this variable for each country over the last 
several decades (depending on the amount of data available for each country). 
Additional economic and demographic control variables are obtained from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators database. We use per-capita GDP, measured in 
purchasing power parity, as the indicator of the country’s wealth level. To control for a 
country’s projected demographic constraints, we include the percentage of the population 
that is projected to be above 65 in the year 2025, as estimated by the U.N. World Population 
Prospects database. We also include credit provided by the private sector, scaled by GDP, as 
a measure of the amount of financial investment and development of the local economy. 
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Table 5 
Empirical Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Model Probit: 
All 
Countries 
Tobit: 
All 
Countries 
Tobit:  
Small 
Reformer  
Tobit:  
Large 
Reformers  
Tobit:  
Large 
Reformers 2# 
Historic Instability 0.235** 0.169** 0.086* 0.116 0.131* (0.100) (0.083) (0.045) (0.075) (0.070) 
Projected % Population 65+ in 2025 0.109*** 0.068*** 0.064*** 0.027 0.018 (0.031) (0.030) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) 
Annual Per Capita PPP GDP (1,000s) -0.057 -0.037 -0.038 -0.018 -0.014 (0.034) (0.031) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022) 
Historic Democracy 0.083** 0.059* 0.041* 0.035 0.035 (0.035) (0.032) (0.021) (0.028) (0.025) 
Domestic Private Sector Credit (%GDP) -0.011* -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Constant -1.653*** -1.207*** -0.941*** -0.437 -0.407 (0.326) (0.401) (0.326) (0.391) (0.366) 
Observations 116 116 102 104 103 
R-Squared 0.231 0.143 0.469 0.090 0.107 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
# Includes larger reformers except Kazakhstan 
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4.2.  Estimates 
 We begin by investigating what motivates the decision to embark on reform itself, 
regardless of the eventual degree of reform, through the following Probit model: 
Yi* = β0 + β1INSi + β2DEMOi + βXi + ei 
Yi* is the latent variable: Y=1 if country i has undergone social security system reform and 
Y=0 otherwise. INS is our constructed measure of historic instability indicating the number of 
times that country i has undergone a political regime change lasting at least 5 years since the 
inception of its traditional public pension system. DEMO is the projected proportion of 
country i’s population aged 65 and older in the year 2025. X is a vector of controls for 
country i consisting of: Purchasing power-adjusted GDP; credit provided to the private sector 
as a percentage of GDP; and, a measure of historic democratic freedom. 
 The Probit estimates displayed in Column (1) in Table 5 demonstrate that, as 
expected, larger degrees of historic instability and greater demographic pressure statistically 
increase the probability of reform. In relative terms, an increase of one point in the index of 
historic instability has roughly the same impact as a two percentage point increase in the 
projected proportion of the population above 65; the marginal effect of the one-point 
instability index increase (not shown) is to increase the probability of reform by 5.4 
percentage points, which represents a one-third increase from the base probability of 14.7 
percent calculated at the mean of independent variables. The controls have the expected 
signs; countries with a larger pre-existing private sector capitalization have a lower 
propensity for reform, while countries with higher values of historic political freedoms are 
more likely to have the political conditions necessary for the public to express their 
preferences for reform. Interestingly, per-capita GDP is not statistically significant, thereby 
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suggesting that the other factors better explain the variation. The Probit model, though, while 
a useful first cut, does not give information about the motivation behind the size of reforms. 
The Tobit estimator is useful for that purpose: 
Yi* = β0 + β1INSi + β2DEMOi + βXi + ei 
Yi* is the latent dependent variable. For values of Yi* above and below the censoring limits 
of 0 and 1, we observe Yi which is the percentage of pension wealth derived from private 
account sources on a 0% to 100% scale, which describes the extent of reform in country i. 
The independent variables were described above. Column (2) of Table 5 reports the results. 
The Tobit estimator shows that an increase in the instability index of one point is 
associated with an unconditional increase of 16.9 percentage points in pension wealth 
derived from private account sources. In contrast, the impact of a one percentage-point 
increase in the projected proportion of the population above 65 is 6.8 percentage points. 
Thus, the estimated effect of a one point increase in the instability index is roughly two and 
half times the effect of a one percentage point increase in demographic pressure.  
Judging the relative impact of instability versus demographic pressure, though, is not 
possible based on these coefficients alone because the associated independent variables are 
not identically normalized. To explore further, the mean value of the instability index is 2.65 
for reforming countries with a standard deviation of 1.71, while the mean value of the 
projected population above 65 is 15.26 with a standard deviation of 5.94. Assuming linearity 
in effects, our coefficients therefore suggest that a one standard deviation change in 
demographic pressures has an approximately 40.53% greater impact on the extent of reform 
(conditional on the reform occurring) than a one standard deviation change in the instability 
index. Still, even these numbers don’t directly test the part of our theory arguing that larger 
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reforms are more likely caused by instability than demographics. These magnitudes are also 
consistent with simply having more countries with smaller reforms (motivated by 
demographics) in the data relative to countries with larger reforms (motivated by instability). 
 We, therefore, also report Tobit estimates over restricted ranges of our dependent 
variable, the size of reform.22 Column (3) of Table 5 reports the Tobit results with only 
smaller reforming nations – those 13 countries in the bottom 50% of reform size -- included 
as reformers. The role of demographics for small reformers is now much greater than 
instability: a one standard deviation change in demographic pressures has a 117% greater 
impact on the extent of reform than a one standard deviation change in the instability index.  
Column (4) of Table 5 reports the Tobit results with only larger reforming nations – 
those in the top 50% of reform size -- included. Now, as suspected, the importance of the 
roles is reversed: a one standard deviation change in the instability index has a 19% greater 
impact on the extent of reform than a one standard deviation change in demographic. 
However, neither statistic is significant at conventional levels (the p value for the instability 
index is 0.126). This insignificance appears to be largely driven by a single outlier with a 
large reform despite the presence only one major period of instability: Kazakhstan. In a rush 
to reform after the fall of communism, this country announced its private pension system 
plans before its public safety net. Hence, to be conservative, we coded Kazakhstan as a 100% 
reformer even though it has since announced a more traditional public safety net (although 
the details still remain sketchy). Column (5) of Table 5 shows the effect of dropping 
Kazakhstan: now instability is significant while the role of demographics remains 
insignificant for large reformers. Taken at their reported values, a one standard deviation 
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change in the instability index has a 99% greater impact on the extent of reform than a one 
standard deviation change in demographic. 
 
4.3. Robustness 
To check the robustness of our results, we first examine the effect of reducing the 
impact of potential outliers, which is potentially quite important in light of our small dataset. 
A standard way of examining the impact of outliers is with median regression analysis with 
iterative weighting. However, our median country is non-reforming (the dependent variable 
is 0%) and so weights cannot be accurately assigned; moreover, this procedure does not 
respect the censoring at 0%.  
Instead, we examine the impact on the Tobit regression of simply dropping the top 
and bottom 10% of reforming countries. Comparison of Column (1) of Table 5 and Column 
(1) of Table 6 shows that the results are basically unchanged, although the importance of 
instability relative to demographics becomes a little larger. 
                                                                                                                                                       
22 A formal “quantile Tobit” estimator that has been recently developed does not solve for our dataset due to the 
significant amount of censoring, as most countries are non-reformers. The restricted estimators that we report, 
therefore, are not full information and are, therefore, not strictly comparable.  
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Table 6 
Robustness Checks 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Model Tobit: 
10% 
Outliers 
Removed 
Cox 
Proportional 
Hazards#  
Tobit:  
Latin 
America 1 
Tobit:  
Latin 
America 2 
Tobit: Large 
Reforms 
and Latin 
America 2 
Historic Instability 0.169** 1.251** -0.150 -0.141 -0.237 (0.074) (0.139) (0.124) (0.125) (0.153) 
Projected % Population 65+ in 2025 0.066**  0.093*** 0.118*** 0.067** (0.027)  (0.031) (0.038) (0.032) 
Annual Per Capita PPP GDP (1,000s) -0.211 0.896** -0.014 -0.005 0.005 (0.027) (0.043) (0.028) (0.029) (0.021) 
Historic Democracy 0.052*  0.004 -0.009 -0.016 (0.030)  (0.033) (0.035) (0.029) 
Domestic Private Sector Credit (%GDP) -0.009* 0.989 -0.009* -0.010* -0.006 (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Annual Life Expectancy  1.145***   
 
 (0.054)    
Latin America * Historic Instability   0.299* 0.224 0.287   (0.163) (0.156) (0.177) 
Latin America * Projected % Population 
65+ in 2025 
  0.032 -0.129* -0.080 
  (0.047) (0.072) (0.060) 
Latin America    2.198*** 1.307*    (0.817) (0.670) 
Constant -1.301***  -1.282*** -1.833*** -0.697 (0.406)  (0.416) (0.587) (0.512) 
Observations 111  116 116 104 
R-Squared 0.220  0.236 0.298 0.338 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
#: Hazard ratios are reported. 
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We also estimate a Cox proportional hazard model with time-varying covariates: 
Hit  = β0 + β1INSit + β2DEMOit + βXit + ei 
Hit is the log of the hazard ratio, the probability of “failure” (reform) at time t for country i. 
Country i is modeled as “failing” in the year t at which that country undergoes pension 
reform; otherwise, country i is assumed to continue without failure until the year 2003, when 
our dataset ends. INS is the instability index of country i at time t, while DEMO is now the 
life expectancy in country i at time t; we are not able to include the share of the population 
that is projected to be above age 65 because a time series of historical population projections 
are not available. The only other control contained in X is the purchasing power GDP in 
country i at time t; our other covariates were not available over the relevant historical period. 
 An advantage of the Cox specification is its ability to include the actual timing of a 
reform. The key disadvantage is the required omission of many important control variables. 
Nonetheless, Column (2) of Table 6 shows that both instability and increases in life 
expectancy are associated with an increased hazard, or probability, of reform. In terms of 
relative effects, an increase in our instability index of one unit increases the risk of reform by 
the same amount as a 1.5 year increase in population life expectancy. 
 Finally, we test the importance of the “Latin America” effect. Brooks (2007) argues 
that peer effects are an important factor behind the adoption of pension reforms with other 
countries following Chile’s pioneering reform. Under this view, reforms are transmitted 
between countries through formal and informal links, which are more pronounced among 
geographic and cultural peers. 
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Table 7 
Demographic Pressure, Historic Instability and Degree of Reform 
 
Country Projected 
% Population 65+ in 
2025 
Historic 
Instability Index 
 
Degree of Reform 
Latin American Countries 
Nicaragua 5.5 2 100.00% 
Bolivia 6.5 3 100.00% 
Dominican Republic 7.3 3 83.81% 
El Salvador 7.5 3 90.97% 
Peru 8.5 4 62.33% 
Columbia 9.3 2 32.51% 
Ecuador 9.7 4 22.96% 
Mexico 9.9 3 98.87% 
Costa Rica 11 0 7.92% 
Argentina 12.7 7 62.98% 
Chile 14.3 5 96.25% 
Uruguay 15.1 6 22.96% 
Eastern European Countries 
Kazakhstan 11.4 1 100.00% 
Russian Federation 17.6 2 26.71% 
Slovakia 19.1 4 39.68% 
Lithuania 19.6 2 25.99% 
Estonia 19.7 1 55.65% 
Poland 20.5 3 44.96% 
Latvia 21.0 3 57.53% 
Hungary 21.3 3 37.96% 
Bulgaria 21.4 3 24.39% 
Croatia 22.5 5 31.48% 
Western Europe and Rest of World 
Australia 19 0 71.69% 
Denmark 20.5 2 79.54% 
Sweden 22.1 1 17.73% 
Switzerland 23.8 0 62.87% 
 
 
  
Of course, peer effects are not inconsistent with our model: similar to our “historic 
democracy” variable, peer effects potentially help enable voters to push for large reforms in 
the face of instability. Nonetheless, Table 7 reveals a striking pattern. The majority of 
reforming countries with severe demographic problems are located in Europe and the former 
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Eastern Europe, while countries with relatively young populations are mostly in Latin 
America. By contrast, no such strong pattern is present in the instability index. Significantly, 
it is largely those countries in Latin America with high instability and relatively young 
populations, who have undertaken the largest degrees of reform. 
Column (3) of Table 6, present results from a modified Tobit model with the 
interaction terms “Latin America * Historic Instability” and “Latin America * Projected % 
Population 65+ in 2025.” The coefficient for the Latin America instability interaction term is 
large and statistically significant at the 10% level while the Latin America population 
interaction term is not. (The previous control for Historic Instability now becomes 
insignificant and the “wrong” sign.) Hence, instability in “Latin America” is associated with 
reform whereas demographics in Latin America seem to play a smaller role. 
Column (4) of Table 6 then adds a fixed-effects indicator for “Latin America” to 
allow for a different intercept for Latin America. Since there are just 14 non-Latin American 
reforming countries and 12 Latin American reformers, this additional control substantially 
slices the data. So, our empirical results, which should already be interpreted with some 
caution, become a bit more suspect. With that caveat in mind, we find a strong and highly 
significant pure “Latin American” intercept effect. This finding has an unclear interpretation 
with our theoretical model. One on hand, it is consistent with a “general revolution” in Latin 
America that is occurring independently of demographics, a conjecture consistent with our 
model. Indeed, notice that the coefficient on the interaction term “Latin America * Projected 
% Population 65+ in 2025” (significant at the 10% level) is now of the “wrong” sign, 
suggesting that demographics play very little (in fact, a negative) role in Latin American 
reforms. On the other hand, the strong “Latin American” intercept could reflect other fixed 
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factors in Latin America outside of our model. The coefficient on the interaction term “Latin 
America * Historic Instability” is of the “correct” sign but has a corresponding p value 
around 15.5, making it significant at the 16% level, outside of conventional levels.  
For additional robustness, Column (5) of Table 6 shows a version of “Large 
Reformers” reported in Column (4) of Table 5 combined with “Latin America 2” reported in 
Column (4) of Table 6. The coefficient on the pure “Latin American” intercept is reduced in 
half (1.31) and is now barely significant at the 5% level. The interaction of “Latin America * 
Historic Instability” is now significant at the 10.7% level, just outside our normal threshold. 
The demographics interaction term is now insignificant (and still of the “wrong” sign).  
 
5. Conclusions 
Fundamental reform of social security systems from traditional pay-as-you-go 
defined benefit systems toward defined-contribution accounts represents one of the most 
important fiscal policy changes worldwide during the past century. The motivation for 
reform has been previously unclear, especially since the traditional pension model is superior 
along several meaningful fronts. Even less clear is why these reforms have been larger in 
developing countries facing less severe demographic problems. We propose a simple model 
of “intergenerational trust” model that is consistent with these stylized facts. The model 
generates fundamental (large) reforms in the face of political instability that are largely not 
demographically driven. Smaller reforms, however, can also emerge, which are mostly 
driven by demographics. Empirical analysis is provided that seems to support the basic tenets 
of the model. However, we interpret our evidence with some caution. Ethnographic country 
case studies could provide useful complementary analysis in the future. 
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Appendix A: Countries in Dataset Listed by Historic Instability 
 
 (Countries in Bold reformed their state pension systems as of 2003) 
 
No Instability (0) Low (1) Low-Moderate (2) Moderate (3) 
Australia Armenia Albania Bolivia 
Bangladesh Azerbaijan Algeria Bulgaria 
Botswana Bahrain Austria Burkina Faso 
Canada Belarus Belgium Dominican Republic 
Costa Rica Burundi Benin El Salvador 
Haiti Cameroon Central African Rep. France 
Israel Chad Colombia Greece 
Jamaica China Congo Guyana 
Laos Cote d’Ivoire Cyprus Hungary 
Lebanon Dem. Rep. Congo Denmark Iran 
New Zealand Egypt Ethiopia Latvia 
Niger Equatorial Guinea Gabon Mexico 
Oman Estonia Germany Panama 
Saudi Arabia Finland Ghana Philippines 
Sierra Leone Georgia Guinea Poland 
Switzerland Honduras Italy Venezuela 
United Kingdom Ireland Kyrgyzstan  
United States Japan Lithuania High (4) 
Vietnam Jordan Madagascar Czech Republic 
Zimbabwe Kazakhstan Mali Ecuador 
 Kuwait Morocco Guatemala 
 Mauritania Netherlands Paraguay 
 Mauritius Nicaragua Peru 
 Norway Pakistan Romania 
 Portugal Republic of Korea Slovakia 
 Moldova Russian Fed. Spain 
 Senegal Rwanda  
 South Africa Sudan Very High (5+) 
 Sweden Tunisia Brazil 
 Syria Ukraine Chile 
 Thailand  Croatia 
 Togo  Slovenia 
 Trinidad and Tobago  Turkey 
 Turkmenistan  Uruguay 
 Uzbekistan  Argentina 
 Yemen   
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Appendix B: Modeling the share of pension payments attributable to the personal accounts 
 
 
 Some countries, like Chile, have replaced their entire pension system with private 
accounts, while other countries have chosen to retain significant elements of their existing public 
pension systems and use private accounts as a supplementary source of retirement income. We 
construct an actuarial model of the future share of pension payments that will be derived from 
the privatized portion of the social security system. This produces a scaled reform variable that 
ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating that 100% of future pension payments in that country will 
come from private accounts. We model all countries with private account reforms in our dataset. 
First, we collected the published rules of the private account system and the 
complementary public pension system after reform. These rules include the contribution rates to 
the private and public pension system, the retirement age, and the payout formulas used for the 
public pension system (Social Security Programs Throughout the World, Various Editions). 
Next, we obtain detailed data on the income distribution of the country, and life expectancy by 
gender (WDI World Development Indicators 2004). We use the income distribution data to 
construct country wages by income percentile, and then model contributions into a private 
account for a typical worker of a given income percentile. At retirement, the worker’s private 
account, with compounded returns, is used to buy an annuity. The cost of the annuity is 
actuarially calculated based on the country-specific life table. The annual value of the annuity is 
the yearly income attributable to the private account component of the pension system. We add 
to this annuity the annual value of the payment provided by the public component of the pension 
system, as determined by the rules of the country’s public pension system, to obtain the total 
annual income available to the worker at retirement. The percentage of this total value which is 
derived from the private account component is the scaled reform variable, which ranges from 0 
for no reform to 1, representing 100% reforms with all retirement income derived from the 
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private accounts. Since contribution rates may differ by income by country, we perform this 
calculation at different income percentiles for each country, and obtain the average scaled reform 
percentage, which corresponds closely to the percentage of income derived from private 
accounts for the median wage earner. 
A simplified structural representation of our modeling process is given by: 
REFORMPCTi = PRIVATEPENSIONi / [PRIVATEPENSIONi + GOVTPENSIONi] 
Where: 
REFORMPCTi = The percentage of retirement income from private account sources for a 
representative retiree in income percentile i (subsequently appropriately weighted to determine 
the average country-wide percentage of retirement income from private account sources) 
GOVTPENSIONi = Sum of annual country-specific government-administered, publicly financed 
transfer payments including specific old age welfare programs and minimum pension guarantees, 
to a representative retiree in income percentile i 
PRIVATEPENSIONi = Value of the annuity purchased with accumulated private account 
contributions by the representative retiree in income percentile i: 
 
where: 
PRIVATEτ = Private account contribution tax rate 
INCOMEX%t = Annual labor income at the Xth percentile of wages in period t 
R = Real rate of return on private account funds, set to 3% 
T = Labor Income Periods till Retirement Age (assuming working life begins at age 20) 
 
Note that our modeling process differs by country due to structural differences such as 
the country’s tax rates on retirement income (if any), contribution ceilings, floors, and caps, 
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guaranteed minimum income plans, and the like. Two major pension system features and their 
modeling decisions are given below: 
 
Redistributive Payments: Many countries explicitly include redistributive elements in their 
pension systems. These often take the form of a minimum pension guarantee or other old-age 
transfers. These transfers are financed by the government, and thus are excluded from 
calculations of the private system’s share of overall pension payments, even when the transfer is 
paid out ‘through’ the private system. In general, redistributive elements will decrease the share 
of pensions attributable to the private system when the income distribution of the country is such 
that a large number of workers will likely qualify for redistributive payments. 
 
Voluntary Participation / Switching Between Systems: Under some systems, workers have a 
choice of participating in the new system or old system, or even of switching between new and 
old systems at certain times. Generally, this choice of participation is limited by age group, so 
older workers have the ability to opt-in while younger workers generally must switch to the new 
system. For simplicity, for all reforms that include age-related opt-outs, we assume that the 
system is fully transitioned to younger workers when modeling private system payouts. 
However, for reforms that give workers the ability to continuously choose which system to 
participate in, we model the NPV of each system choice for a representative worker of that 
income group, and have the worker choose the system which offers them the higher NPV at that 
point in time. 
 
The spreadsheets used in calculating each country’s scaled reform variable are available from the 
authors. 
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Appendix C: Variable Definitions and Sources for Empirical Estimation (Section 4) 
 
Variable Description / Source 
Instability Based on the DURABLE variable from the Polity IV Project: 
Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2006 
database. DURABLE is a country by year level observation that 
indicates the number of years since the last regime change in that 
country. Instability measures the number of times, since the creation 
of that country’s public pension system, that DURABLE reaches 5. 
Thus, Instability is higher for countries with frequent regime changes. 
WDI: Annual Per Capita 
PPP GDP in 1,000s 
(Inter/Expolated) 
Based on NYGDPPCAPPPKD from the World Development 
Indicators 2005 database from the World Bank. Annual Per-Capital 
Purchasing Power Parity GDP, in $1,000s of dollars. Due to data 
continuity problems, data is interpolated and extrapolated when 
necessary to ensure a balanced panel for estimates. 
WDI: Annual % Of 
Population 65+ 
Obtained from SPPOP65UPTOZS from the World Development 
Indicators 2005 database from the World Bank. Percentage of the 
country’s total population in that year who are aged 65 years and 
older. 
UN Projected 
Population 65+ in 2025, 
Percent of Total 
Population 
Obtained from World Population Prospects, the 2004 Revision, 
Medium Variant. United Nations Population Division. 
Historic Democracy Based on the POLITY2 variable from the Polity IV Project database. 
POLITY2 is a country by year level observation that ranges from +10 
(strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Historic 
Democracy is the average historical POLITY2 score for the period 
between the creation of that country’s public pension system, and the 
year of reform or the year 2003, whichever comes first.  
WDI: Domestic Credit 
to Private Sector, % of 
GDP 
Based on FSASTPRVTGDZS from the World Development 
Indicators 2005 database from the World Bank. Domestic Credit to 
Private Sector refers to financial resources provided to the private 
sector, such as through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and 
trade credits and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for 
repayment. For some countries these claims include credit to public 
enterprises. Domestic Credit to Private Sector is divided by country’s 
GDP and expressed as a multiple of GDP. 
WDI: Annual 
Interpolated and 
Extrapolated Life 
Expectancy 
Based on SPDYNLE00IN from the World Development Indicators 
2005 database. SPDYNLE00IN is a country by year observation 
indicating that country’s current life expectancy at birth. Due to data 
continuity problems, we interpolate and extrapolate this variable to 
form a continuous series. 
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